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Abstrat
In ommon-interest stohasti games all players reeive an idential payo. Players
partiipating in suh games must learn to oordinate with eah other in order to reeive the
highest-possible value. A number of reinforement learning algorithms have been proposed
for this problem, and some have been shown to onverge to good solutions in the limit.
In this paper we show that using very simple model-based algorithms, muh better (i.e.,
polynomial) onvergene rates an be attained. Moreover, our model-based algorithms are
guaranteed to onverge to the optimal value, unlike many of the existing algorithms.
1. Introdution
In some learning ontexts, the learning system is atually a olletion of omponents, or
agents, that have some ommon goal or a ommon utility funtion. The distributed nature
of suh systems makes the problem of learning to at in an unknown environment more
diÆult beause the agents must oordinate both their learning proess and their ation
hoies. However, the need to oordinate is not restrited to distributed agents, as it
arises naturally among self-interested agents in ertain environments. A good model for
suh environments is that of a ommon-interest stohasti game (CISG). A stohasti game
(Shapley, 1953) is a model of multi-agent interations onsisting of multiple nite or innite
stages, in eah of whih the agents play a one-shot strategi form game. The identity of
eah stage depends stohastially on the previous stage and the ations performed by the
agents in that stage. The goal of eah agent is to maximize some funtion of its reward
stream - either its average reward or its sum of disounted rewards. A CISG is a stohasti
game in whih at eah point the payo of all agents is idential.
Various algorithms for learning in CISGs have been proposed in the literature. These
inlude speialized algorithms for ertain lasses of CISGs, (e.g., Claus & Boutilier, 1997;
Wang & Sandholm, 2002), as well as more general algorithms for learning in general stohas-
ti games that onverge to a Nash equilibrium (e.g., Littman, 1994; Hu & Wellman, 1998;
Littman, 2001; Bowling & Veloso, 2001) and an be applied to CISGs. For many of these,
results that show onvergene in the limit to an equilibrium exist. However, all urrent algo-
rithms suer from at least one of the following when applied to CISGs: (1) When multiple
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equilibria exist, there is no guarantee of onvergene to an optimal equilibrium. (2) They
are not known to be eÆient { i.e., at best, they have onvergene in the limit guarantees. In
addition, many of the algorithms make strong assumptions about the information obtained
by the agents during the ourse of the game. In partiular, the agents know what ations
are available to eah other in eah stage of the game, and they an observe the hoies made
by the other agents. This latter assumption is alled perfet monitoring in the game-theory
literature. This is to be ontrasted with imperfet monitoring in whih it is assumed that
eah agent an only observe its own payo, but it annot observe the ations performed by
the other players.
In this paper we show that using a simple model-based approah, we an provide al-
gorithms with far better theoretial guarantees, and often, in more general settings than
previous algorithms. More preisely, we provide a learning algorithm with polynomial-time
onvergene to a near-optimal value in stohasti ommon-interest games under imperfet
monitoring. In the ase of repeated games, our algorithm onverges to the atual optimal
value. The key to our result is a reent powerful learning algorithm, R-max (Brafman &
Tennenholtz, 2002). In partiular, the following aspet of R-max plays a ruial role: it
is a deterministi learning algorithm that guarantees polynomial-time onvergene to near-
optimal value in the single-agent ase.
1
We note that in our treatment of stohasti games
we make the standard assumption that the state is fully observable. That is, the agents
reognize the \situation" in whih they are in at eah point in time.
In the following setion, we provide the neessary bakground on stohasti games. In
Setion 3, we disuss the basi algorithm and its partiular variants. In Setion 4 we on-
lude the paper with a disussion of some important variants: n-player ommon-interest
stohasti games and repeated games. Beause an understanding of R-max and its on-
vergene properties is needed for a more omplete piture of our results, we provide this
information in the Appendix.
2. Bakground
We start with a set of standard denitions and a disussion of the basi assumptions of our
approah.
2.1 Game Denitions
A game is a model of multi-agent interation. In a strategi form game, we have a set of
players, eah of whom hooses some ation to perform from a given set of ations. As a result
of the players' ombined hoies, some outome is obtained whih is desribed numerially
in the form of a payo vetor, i.e., a vetor of values, one for eah of the players. We
onentrate on two-player games. General n-person games an be treated similarly.
A ommon desription of a two-player strategi-form game is in the form of a matrix.
The rows of the matrix orrespond to player 1's ations and the olumns orrespond to
player 2's ations. The entry in row i and olumn j in the game matrix ontains the
rewards obtained by the players if player 1 plays his i
th
ation and player 2 plays his j
th
ation. The set of possible ombined hoies of the agents are alled joint ations. Thus,
1. In fat, R-max onverges in zero-sum stohasti games as well, but we will not need this apability.
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if player 1 has k possible ations and player 2 has l possible ations, there are k  l joint
ations in the game. Without loss of generality, we assume that the payo of a player in a
game is taken from the interval of real numbers P = [0; R
max
℄.
A ommon-interest game is a game in whih the rewards obtained by all agents are
idential. A oordination game is a ommon-interest game in whih all agents have the same
set A of ations, and, in addition, for every i, the reward all agents reeive for seleting the
joint ation (i; i) is greater than the reward they reeive for seleting (i; j) for any j 6= i.
In a repeated game the players play a given game G repeatedly. We an view a repeated
game, with respet to a game G, as onsisting of an innite number of iterations, for eah
of whih the players have to selet an ation of the game G. After playing eah iteration,
the players reeive the appropriate payos, as ditated by that game's matrix, and move to
the next iteration.
A stohasti game is a game in whih the players play a possibly innite sequene of
one-shot, strategi form games from some given set of games, whih we shall take to be
nite. After playing eah game, the players reeive the appropriate payo, as ditated by
that game's matrix, and move to a new game. The identity of this new game depends,
stohastially, on the previous game and on the players' ations in that previous game.
Formally:
Denition 1 A two player, stohasti-game M on states S = f1; : : : ; Ng, and ations
A = fa
1
; : : : ; a
k
g, onsists of:
 Stage Games: eah state s 2 S is assoiated with a two-player game in strategi
form, where the ation set of eah player is A.
 Probabilisti Transition Funtion: tr(s; t; a; a
0
) is the probability of a transition
from state s to state t given that the rst player plays a and the seond player plays
a
0
.
A stohasti game is similar to a Markov deision proess (MDP). In both models
ations lead to transitions between states of the world. The main dierene is that in an
MDP the transition depends on the ation of a single player whereas in a stohasti game
the transition depends on the joint ation of both players. In addition, in a stohasti game,
the reward obtained by the player for performing an ation depends on its ation and the
ation of the other player. To model this, we assoiate a game with every state. Therefore,
we often use the terms state, stage game, and game interhangeably.
Muh like in regular one-shot games, we an restrit our attention to speial lasses of
stohasti and repeated games. In partiular, in this paper we are interested in ommon-
interest stohasti games (CISGs), i.e., stohasti games in whih eah stage-game is a
ommon-interest game. CISGs an be viewed as a speial extension of MDPs. They or-
respond to an MDP in whih the agent is atually a distributed system. That is, it has
dierent omponents, all of whih inuene the hoie of ation, but all of whih work to-
ward a ommon goal. Thus, for every CISG, we dene its indued MDP to be the MDP
obtained from the CISG when we assume the existene of a single agent that ontrols all
the agents in the CISG. That is, a single agent whose set of ations orresponds to the
joint-ations of the CISG agents. Beause the payos for all agents are idential, this is a
well-dened onept.
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Eah history of length t in a game with perfet monitoring onsists of a sequene of t
tuples of the form (stage-game, joint ations, payos), followed by the last state reahed.
Thus, the set of possible histories of length t in a game with perfet monitoring is (SA
2

P )
t
S. We denote the set of histories of any length in this setting by H
p
. Similarly, in the
ase of imperfet monitoring, eah history is a sequene of tuples of the form (stage-game,
single-agent ation, single-agent payo), followed by the last state reahed. Thus, the set
of possible histories of length t in a game with imperfet monitoring is (S  A  P )
t
 S,
and the set of possible histories in this setting is denoted H
imp
.
Given a CISG with imperfet monitoring (respetively, perfet monitoring), a poliy
for the agent is a mapping from H
imp
(respetively, H
p
) to the set of possible probability
distributions over A. Hene, a poliy determines the probability of hoosing eah partiular
ation for eah possible history. A pure poliy is a deterministi poliy. A stationary poliy
is one in whih the ation is a funtion of the last state only.
In dening the value of a CISG, we treat it muh like an MDP beause the ultimate goal
is to provide a oordinated strategy for the agents that will lead to the maximal reward.
We use the average expeted reward riterion. Given a CISG M and a natural number T ,
U(s; ; ; T ) denotes the expeted T -step undisounted average reward when player 1 follows
poliy  and player 2 follows poliy  starting from state s. The optimal T-step value for
M starting at s is U(s; T ) = max
(;)
U(s; ; ; T ). We dene U(s) = lim inf
T!1
U(s; T ),
and refer to it as the value of s
2.2 Assumptions, Complexity and Optimality
The setting we onsider is one in whih agents have a ommon interest. We assume that
these agents are aware of the fat that they have a ommon interest and that they know
the number of agents that partiipate in this game. This is most natural in a distributed
system. Moreover, we assume that they all employ the same learning algorithm; this latter
assumption is ommon to most work in oordination learning. It is quite natural if the
agents are part of a distributed system, or if there exists a standard, ommonly aepted
algorithm for oordination learning.
We make a number of additional assumptions: First, we assume that the agent always
reognizes the identity of the stage-game it reahed, but not its assoiated payos and
transition probabilities. Seond, we assume that the maximal possible reward, R
max
is
known ahead of time. Finally, we restrit our attention to ergodi CISGs, whih, in a sense,
are the only lass of CISGs for whih the type of result we seek is possible. Kearns and
Singh introdued the ergodiity assumption in the ontext of their E
3
algorithm for learning
in MDPs (Kearns & Singh, 1998). A similar assumption was used by Homan and Karp
(1966) in the ontext of stohasti games, where it is referred to as irreduibility. An MDP
is said to be ergodi if the Markov-hain obtained by xing any pure stationary poliy is
ergodi. That is, if any state is reahable from any other state. We restrit our attention
to CISGs whose indued MDP is ergodi.
Irreduible stohasti games and ergodi MDPs have a number of nie properties, as
shown by Homan and Karp (1966). First, the maximal long-term average reward is inde-
pendent of the starting state, implying that U(s) is atually independent of s. Thus, from
now on we use v(M) to denote the optimal value of the game M , whih is idential to U(s)
14
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for all states s. Seond, this optimal value an be obtained by a stationary poliy, i.e., by
a poliy that depends on the urrent stage-game only. In partiular, in the ase of CISGs,
this optimal value an be obtained using a pure stationary strategy.
In a sense, there seems to be little point in theoretial disussions of learning in the
ontext of MDPs and CISGs that are not ergodi. It is evident that in order to learn the
agent must perform some sort of impliit or expliit exploration. If the MDP is not ergodi,
the agent's initial hoies an have irreversible onsequenes on its long-term value. But one
annot expet the agent to always make orret initial hoies when it has no knowledge of
the game.
Next, we wish to disuss the entral parameter in the analysis of the omplexity { the
mixing time { rst identied by Kearns and Singh (1998). Kearns and Singh argue that
it is unreasonable to refer to the eÆieny of learning algorithms without referring to the
eÆieny of onvergene to a desired value given omplete information. They dened the
-return mixing time of a poliy  (in an MDP) to be the smallest value of T suh that for
all t > T , and for any starting state s, the expeted average reward of  is at least  lose
to the expeted innite horizon average reward of . That is, letting U(s; ; t) denote the
expeted t-step average reward of  starting at s, dene U() = lim inf
t!1
U(s; ; t), where
this latter value does not depend on the hoie of s beause of the ergodiity assumption.
The -return mixing time of , T satises:
T = min
T
0
1
8s; t
0
 T
0
: U(s; ; t
0
) > U()  :
Notie that the mixing time has nothing to do with learning. It is inuened by the
stohasti nature of the model and its interation with the poliy { however obtained.
We adopt their denition, but with respet to the MDP indued by the CISG of interest.
Finally, we dene a near-optimal polynomial-time learning algorithm for CISGs to be a
learning algorithm A suh that given a CISG M , some  > 0;  > 0 and 0 < Æ < 1, there
exists some T > 0 that is polynomial in 1=; 1=Æ; 1=, the -return mixing time of an optimal
poliy, and the size of the desription of the game, suh that for every t > T the atual
t-step average reward obtained by A is at least (1  )(v(M)  2), with a probability of at
least 1  Æ.
Notie that the above denition requires that if we onsider any partiular, xed t > T ,
then the atual average reward will be lose to optimal with an overwhelming probability.
3. The Algorithms
The following is our basi result:
Theorem 1 There exists an near-optimal polynomial time algorithm for learning in two-
player CISGs under imperfet monitoring provided that all agents have a shared polynomial
bound
2
on the number of ations of eah other.
We note that in ertain speial sub-ases, e.g., under perfet monitoring, there will be no
need for the multipliative fator of 1  .
2. Formally, we will assume that there is a onstant k  1, suh that if the number of ations available to
agent i is f
i
, then it is ommonly known that any agent an have a most of f = (max(f
1
; f
2
))
k
ations.
Other ways of formalizing this onept are treated similarly.
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An immediate orollary of Theorem 1 is:
Corollary 1 There exists a near-optimal polynomial time algorithm for learning in CISGs
under imperfet monitoring provided that all agents know that all stage games are oordi-
nation games.
Proof: Coordination games are a speial instane of CISGs. In partiular, in these games
we have an idential number of ations for all players, so eah player has a polynomial
bound on the number of ations available to the other players. 2
The proof of Theorem 1 will proeed in stages using suessively weaker assumptions.
The redution will be from a partiular multi-agent ase to the ase of single-agent learning
in MDPs. The settings in the rst ases is quite natural for a distributed system, whereas
the latter ases make quite weak assumptions on the agents' knowledge of eah other. To
sueed in our proof, the single-agent learning algorithm to whih the problem is redued
must have the following properties:
 It is a near-optimal polynomial time algorithm. That is, given  > 0 and 0 < Æ < 1,
then with a probability of 1  Æ, the algorithm, when applied to an MDP, leads to an
atual average payo that is -lose to the optimal payo for any t > T , where T is
polynomial in 1=; 1=Æ, the -return mixing time, and the desription of the MDP.
 The preise value of T an be omputed ahead of time given , Æ, the -return mixing
time of the optimal poliy, and the desription of the MDP.
 The algorithm is deterministi. That is, given a partiular history, the algorithm will
always selet the same ation.
One suh algorithm is R-max (Brafman & Tennenholtz, 2002), desribed in detail in the
Appendix. In order to make the presentation more onrete, and sine, at the moment,
R-max appears to be the only algorithm with these properties, we expliitly refer to it in
the proof. However, any other algorithm with the above properties an be used instead.
We now proeed with the desription of the redutions. Note: In Cases 1-5 below, we
assume that the -return mixing time of an optimal poliy, denoted by T
mix
is known. For
example, in repeated games, T
mix
is 1. In stohasti games, on the other hand, T
mix
is
unlikely to be known. However, this assumption is useful for later development. In Case 6,
we remove this assumption using a standard tehnique. Finally, in all ases we assume that
the learning auray parameters { , Æ, and  { are known to all agents.
Case 1: Common order over joint ations. This ase is handled by redution to the
single-agent ase.
If all agents share an ordering over the set of joint ations in every stage game, then
they an emulate the single-agent R-max algorithm on the indued MDP. This follows
from the fat that R-max is deterministi. Thus, the agents start with an initially idential
model. They all know whih joint ation a single-agent would exeute initially, and so they
exeute their part of that joint ation. Sine all agents observe their own reward always.
And beause this is idential to all agents, the update of the model will be the same for
all agents. Thus, the model of all agents is always idential. Therefore, in essene we
16
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have a distributed, oordinated exeution of the R-max algorithm, and the result follows
immediately from the properties of R-max. Note that Case 1 does not require perfet
monitoring.
We note that many ases an be redued to this ase. Indeed, below we present teh-
niques for handling a number of more diÆult ases in whih an ordering does not exist,
that work by redution to Case 1. We note that in speial games in whih there is suÆient
asymmetry in the game (e.g., dierent ation set sizes, dierent o-diagonal payos) it is
possible to devise more eÆient methods for generating an ordering (e.g., via randomiza-
tion).
Case 2: A ommonly known ordering over the agents, and knowledge of the
ation-set size of all agents. First, suppose that the agents not only know the ation
set sizes of eah other, but also share a ommon ordering over the ations of eah agent.
This indues a natural lexiographi ordering over the joint ations based on the ordering
of eah agent's ations and the ordering over the agents. Thus, we are bak in ase 1.
In fat, we do not really need a ommon ordering over the ation set of eah agent. To
see this, onsider the following algorithm:
 Eah agent will represent eah joint ation as a vetor. The k
th
omponent of this
vetor is the index of the ation performed by agent k in this joint ation. Thus, (3; 4)
denotes the joint ation in whih the rst agent aording to the ommon ordering
performs its third ation, and the seond agent performs its fourth ation.
 At eah point, the agent will hoose the appropriate joint ation using R-max. The
hoie will be idential for all agents, provided the model is idential.
 Beause eah agent only performs its aspet of the joint ation, there annot be any
onfusion over the identities of the ations. Thus, if R-max determines that the
urrent ation is (3; 4), then agent 1 will perform its third ation and agent 2 will
perform its fourth ation.
The model is initialized in an idential manner by all agents. It is updated identially by
all agents beause at eah point, they all hoose the same vetor and their rewards are
idential. The fat that when the hosen joint ation is (3; 4) agent 1 does not know what
preisely is the fourth ation of agent 2 does not matter.
Following Case 2, we an show that we an deal eÆiently with a perfet monitoring
setup.
Case 3: Perfet Monitoring. We an redue the ase of perfet monitoring to Case 2
above as follows. First, we make the ation set sizes known to all agents as follows: In the
rst phases of the game, eah agent will play its ations one after the other, returning to
its rst ation, eventually. This will expose the number of ations. Next, we establish a
ommon ordering over the agents as follows: Eah agent randomly selets an ation. The
agent that seleted an ation with a lower index will be the rst agent. Thus, we are now
bak in Case 2.
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We note that muh of the work on learning oordination to date has dealt with ase 3
above in the more restrited setting of a repeated game.
Case 4: Known ation set sizes. What prevents us from using the approah of Case 2
is the lak of ommon ordering over the agents. We an deal with this problem as follows: In
an initial order exploration phase, eah agent randomly selets an ordering over the agents
and ats based on this ordering. This is repeated for m trials. The length of eah trial is T
0
,
where T
0
is suh that R-max will return an atual average reward that is -lose to optimal
after T
0
steps with a probability of at least 1  Æ=2, provided that an idential ordering was
hosen by all agents. m is hosen so that with high probability in one of the trials all agents
will hoose the same ordering.
One the order exploration phase is done, eah agent selets the ordering that led to the
best average reward in the order exploration phase and uses the poliy generated for that
ordering for Q steps. Q must be large enough to ensure that the losses during the order
exploration phase are ompensated for { an expliit form is given below. Hopefully, the
hosen ordering is indeed idential. However, it may be that it was not idential but simply
led to a good average reward in the order exploration phase. In the exploitation phase, it
ould however lead to lower average rewards. Therefore, while exploiting this poliy, the
agent heks after eah step that the atual average reward is similar to the average reward
obtained by this poliy in the order exploration phase. T
0
is hosen to be large enough to
ensure that a poliy with -return mixing time of T
mix
will, with high probability yield an
atual reward that is -lose to optimal. If the average is not as expeted, then with high
probability the hosen ordering is not idential for all agents. One this happens, the agents
move to the next best ordering. Notie that suh a hange an take plae at most m   1
times.
Notie that whenever we realize in step T that the atual average reward is too low, a
loss of at most
R
max
T
is generated. By hoosing T
0
suh that
R
max
T
0
<

m
, we get that we
remain in the sope of the desired payo (i.e., 2 from optimal). The 1=m fator is needed
beause this error an happen at most m times.
We now show that Q and m an be hosen so that the running time of this algorithm
is still polynomial in the problem parameters, and that the atual average reward will be
-lose to optimal times 1    with probability of at least 1   Æ. First, notie that the
algorithm an fail either in the order exploration phase or in the exploitation phases. We
will ensure that either failure ours with a probability of less the Æ=2.
Consider the order-exploration phase. We must hoose m so that with probability of at
least 1  Æ=2 an iteration ours in whih:
 An idential ordering is generated by all agents;
 R-max leads to an -lose to optimal average reward.
In a two-player game, the probability of an idential ordering being generated by both
agents is 1=2. With an appropriate, and still polynomial, hoie of T
0
, the probability of
R-max sueeding given an idential ordering is at least 1  Æ=2. We now hoose m so that
[1   (1=2  (1   Æ=2))℄
m
< Æ=2, and this an be satised by an m that is polynomial in Æ.
Notie that this bounds the failure probability in seleting the right ordering and obtaining
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the desired payo, and that the above inequality holds whenever m >
log(Æ=2)
log([1 (1=2(1 Æ=2))℄)
>
jlog(Æ=2)j, whih is polynomial in the problem parameters.
Next, onsider the exploitation phases. Given that we sueeded in the exploration
phase, at some point in the exploitation phase we will exeute an -optimal poliy for Q
iterations. If Q is suÆiently large, we an ensure that this will yield an atual average
reward that is -lose to optimal with a probability that is larger than 1  Æ=2. Thus, eah
failure mode has less than Æ=2 probability, and overall, the failure probability is less than Æ.
Finally, we need to onsider what is required to ensure that the average reward of this
whole algorithm will be as high as we wanted. We know that during the Q exploration
steps an -lose to optimal value is attained. However, there an be up to m  1 repetitions
of T -step iterations in whih we obtain a lower expeted reward. Thus, we must have that
Q(v(M) )
Q+2mT
> (1  )  (v(M)  ). This is satised if Q >
1

2mT whih is still polynomial in
the problem parameters.
Case 5: Shared polynomial bound on ation-set sizes. We repeat the tehnique used
in Case 4, but for every hosen ordering over the agents, the agents systematially searh
the spae of possible ation-set sizes. That is, let Sizes be some arbitrary total ordering
over the set of all possible ation set sizes onsistent with the ation-set size bounds. The
atual hoie of Sizes is xed and part of the agents' algorithm. Now, for eah ation sets
size in Sizes, the agents repeat the exploration phase of Case 4, as if these were the true
ation sets sizes. Again, the agents stik to the ation-set size and ordering of agents that
led to the best expeted payo, and they will swith to the next best ordering and sizes if
the average reward is lower than expeted.
Let b be the agents' bound on their ation sets sizes. The only dierene between our
ase and Case 4 is that the initial exploration phase must be longer by a fator of b
2
, and
that in the exploitation phase we will have to swith O(m  b
2
) poliies at most. In parti-
ular, we now need to attempt possible orderings for the b
2
possibilities for the size of the
joint ations set. Thus, the failure probabilities are treated as above, and Q needs to be
inreased so that
Q(v(M) )
Q+2mb
2
T
> (1   )  (v(M)   ). Q remains polynomial in the problem
parameters.
Case 6: Polynomial bound on ation set sizes, unknown mixing time. In this ase
we reah the setting disussed in Theorem 1 in its full generality. To handle it, we use the
following fat: R-max provides a onrete bound on the number of steps required to obtain
near-optimal average reward for a given mixing time. Using this bound, we an provide a
onrete bound for the running time of all the ases above, and in partiular, Case 5. This
enables us to use the standard tehnique for overoming the problem of unknown mixing
time that was used in E
3
(Kearns & Singh, 1998) and in R-max. Namely, the agents run
the algorithm for inreasing values of the mixing time. For every xed mixing time, we
operate as in Case 4{5, but ensuring that we ahieve a multipliative fator of 1   =2,
instead of 1 . Suppose that the orret mixing time is T . Thus, when the agents run the
algorithm for an assumed mixing time t smaller than T , we expet an average reward lower
than optimal, and we need to ompensate for these losses when we get to T . These losses
are bounded by the optimal value times the number of steps we ated sub-optimally. This
number of steps is polynomial in the problem parameters. Suppose that when T is reahed,
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we are suddenly told that we have reahed the true mixing time. At that point, we an
try to ompensate for our previous losses by ontinuing to at optimally for some period of
time. The period of time required to ompensate for our previous losses is polynomial in
the problem parameters.
Of ourse, no one tells us that we have reahed the true mixing time. However, whenever
we at based on the assumption that the mixing time is greater than T , but still polynomial
in T , our atual average reward will remain near optimal. Thus, the stages of the algorithm
in whih the assumed mixing time is greater than T automatially ompensate for the stages
in whih the mixing time is lower than T . Thus, there exists some T
0
polynomial in T and
the other problem parameters, suh that by the time we run Case 5 under the assumption
that T
0
is the mixing time, we will ahieve an -lose to optimal reward with a multipliative
fator of 1  =2. In addition, when
T
T
0
< (1  =2) we get that the multipliative loss due
what happened before we have reahed the mixing time T is another (1   =2) fator.
Altogether, when we reah the assumed mixing time of T
0
, we get the desired value with a
multipliative fator of 1  .
Having shown how to handle Case 6, we are done with the proof of Theorem 1. 2
4. Disussion
We showed that polynomial-time oordination is possible under the very general assumption
of imperfet monitoring and a shared polynomial bound on the size of the ation sets. To
ahieve this result, we relied on the existene of a deterministi algorithm for learning near-
optimal poliies for MDPs in polynomial time. One suh algorithm is R-max, and it may
be possible to generate a deterministi variant of E
3
(Kearns & Singh, 1998).
Our algorithms range from a very simple and extremely eÆient approah to learning
in perfet monitoring games, to oneptually simple but omputationally more omplex
algorithms for the most general ase overed. Whether these latter algorithms are eÆient
in pratie relative to algorithms based on, e.g., Q-learning, and whether they an form
a basis for more pratial algorithms, remains an interesting issue for future work whih
we plan to pursue. Regardless of this question, our algorithms demonstrate learly that
oordination-learning algorithms should strive for more than onvergene in the limit to
some equilibrium, and that more general lasses of CISGs with a more restritive information
struture an be dealt with.
In Setion 3, we restrited our attention to two-player games. However, we used a more
general language that applies to n-player games so that the algorithms themselves extend
naturally. The only issue is the eet on the running time of moving from a onstant number
of agents to n-player games. First, observe that the size of the game matries is exponential
in the number of agents. This implies that little hanges in the analysis of the earlier ases
in whih a shared xed ordering over the set of agents exists. The omplexity of these ases
inreases exponentially in the number of agents, but so does the size of the game so the
algorithm remains polynomial in the input parameters.
If we do not have a shared ordering over the agents, then we need to onsider the set
of n! possible orderings. Notie however that although the number of orderings of the
players is exponential in the number of players, using the tehnique of ase 4, we get that
with overwhelming probability the players will hoose idential orderings after time that is
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polynomial in the number of suh orderings. More speially, Cherno bound implies that
after P (n!) trials, for a polynomial P implied by the bound, we will get with overwhelming
probability that the same ordering on ations will be seleted by all agents. Hene, although
this number might be large (when n is large), if the number of agents, n, is smaller than
the number of ations available, a, this results in a number of iterations that is polynomial
in the representation of the game, sine the representation of game requires a
n
entries.
Naturally, in these ases it will be of interest to onsider suint representations of the
stohasti game, but this goes beyond the sope of this paper.
One speial lass of CISGs is that of ommon-interest repeated games. This lass an
be handled in a muh simpler manner beause there is no need to learn transition funtions
and to oordinate the transitions. For example, in the most general ase (i.e., imperfet
monitoring) the following extremely simple, yet eÆient algorithm an be used: the agents
play randomly for some T steps, following whih they selet the rst ation to provide
the best immediate reward. If T is hosen appropriately, we are guaranteed to obtain the
optimal value with high probability. T will be polynomial in the problem parameters. More
speially, if eah agent has k available ations then the probability of hoosing an optimal
pair of ations is
1
k
2
. This implies that after k
3
trials we get that the optimal joint ation
will be hosen with probability approahing 1  e
 k
.
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Appendix A. The R-max Algorithm
Here we desribe the MDP version of the R-max algorithm. R-max an handle zero-sum
stohasti games as well, but this apability is not required for the oordination algorithms
of this paper. For more details, onsult (Brafman & Tennenholtz, 2002).
We onsider an MDP M onsisting of a set S = fs
1
; : : : ; s
N
g of states in eah of whih
the agent has a set A = fa
1
; : : : ; a
k
g of possible ations. A reward funtion R assigns an
immediate reward for eah of the agent's ations at every state. We use R(s; a) to denote the
reward obtained by the agent after playing ations a in state s. Without loss of generality,
we assume all rewards are positive.
In addition, we have a probabilisti transition funtion, tr, suh that tr(s; a; t) is the
probability of making a transition from state s to state t given that the agent played a. It is
onvenient to think of tr(s; a; ) as a funtion assoiated with the ation a in the stage-game
s. This way, all model parameters, both rewards and transitions, are assoiated with an
ation at a partiular state.
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Reall that in our setting, eah state of the MDP orresponds to a stage-game and eah
ation of the \agent" orresponds to a joint ation of our group of agents.
R-max is a model-based algorithm. It maintains its own model M
0
of the real world
model M . M
0
is initialized in an optimisti fashion by making the payos for every ation
in every state maximal. What is speial about R-max is that the agent always does the
best thing aording to its urrent model, i.e., it always exploits. However, if this behavior
leads to new information, the model is updated.
Beause, initially, the model is inaurate, exploitation with respet to it may turn
out to be exploration with respet to the real model. This is a result of our optimisti
initialization of the reward funtion. This initialization makes state-ation pairs that have
not been attempted many times look attrative beause of the high payo they yield.
Let  > 0, and let R
max
denote the maximal possible reward, i.e., R
max
def
= max
s;a
R(s; a).
For ease of exposition, we assume that T , the -return mixing time of the optimal poliy, is
known.
Initialize: Construt the followingMDPmodelM
0
onsisting ofN+1 states, fs
0
; s
1
; : : : ; s
N
g,
and k ations, fa
1
; : : : ; a
k
g. Here, s
1
; : : : ; s
N
orrespond to the real states, fa
1
; : : : ; a
k
g
orrespond to the real ations, and s
0
is an additional titious state. Initialize R suh
that R(s; a) = R
max
for every state s and ation a. Initialize tr(s
i
; a; s
0
) = 1 for all
i = 0; : : : ; N and for all ations a (and therefore, tr(s
i
; a; s
j
) = 0 for all j 6= 0).
In addition, maintain the following information for eah state-ation pair: (1) a
boolean value known/unknown, initialized to unknown; (2) the list of states reahed
by playing this ation in this state, and how many times eah state was reahed; (3)
the reward obtained when playing this ation in this state. Items 2 and 3 are initially
empty.
Repeat:
Compute and At: Compute an optimal T -step poliy for the urrent state, and
exeute it for T -steps or until some state-ation pair hanges its value to known.
Observe and update: Following eah ation do as follows: Let a be the ation you
performed and s the state you were in;
 If the ation a is performed for the rst time in s, update the reward asso-
iated with (s; a), as observed.
 Update the set of states reahed from s by playing a.
 If at this point your reord of states reahed from this entry ontains
K
1
= max((d
4NTR
max

)
3
e; d 6ln
3
(
Æ
6Nk
2
)e) + 1 elements, mark this state-
ation pair as known, and update the transition probabilities for this entry
aording to the observed frequenies.
The basi property of R-max is aptured by the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Let M be an MDP with N states and k ations. Let 0 < Æ < 1, and  > 0
be onstants. Denote the poliies for M whose -return mixing time is T by (; T ), and
denote the optimal expeted return ahievable by suh poliies by Opt((; T )). Then, with
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probability of no less than 1   Æ the R-max algorithm will attain an expeted return of
Opt((; T ))  2 within a number of steps polynomial in N; k; T;
1

, and
1
Æ
.
Reall that we rely heavily on the fat that R-max is deterministi for MDPs. This
follows from the existene of a deterministi algorithm for generating an optimal T -step
poliy. Algorithms for generating an optimal T -step poliy for an MDP are deterministi,
exept for the fat that at ertain hoie points, a number of ations may have the same
value, and eah hoie is aeptable. In that ase, one needs only generate an arbitrary
ordering over the ations and always hoose, e.g., the rst ation. This is why in our
algorithm the generation of a shared ordering over the ations plays an important role. Note
that, without loss of generality, for MDPs we an restrit our attention to deterministi T -
step poliies. This fat is important in our ase beause our oordination algorithm would
not work if mixed poliies were required.
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